The Apollo Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Architecture Decision Revisited by Reeves, David M. et al.











David M.  Reeves1  
Georgia Institute of Technology 
National Institute of Aerospace, Hampton, VA, 23666 
 
Michael D.  Scher2
University of Maryland 
National Institute of Aerospace, Hampton, VA, 23666 
  
Dr. Alan W.  Wilhite3
Georgia Institute of Technology 
National Institute of Aerospace, Hampton, VA, 23666 
 
Dr. Douglas O.  Stanley4
Georgia Institute of Technology 





The 1962 Apollo architecture mode decision process was revisited with modern analysis 
and systems engineer tools to determine driving selection criteria and 
technology/operational mode design decisions that may be used for NASA’s current 
Space Exploration program.  Results of the study agreed with the Apollo selection of the 
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous mode based on the technology maturity and politics in 1962.  
Using today’s greater emphasis on human safety and improvements in technology and 
design maturity, a slight edge may be given to the direct lunar mode over lunar orbit 
rendezvous.  Also, the NOVA direct mode and Earth orbit rendezvous mode are not 
competitive based any selection criteria.  Finally, reliability and development, operations, 
and production costs are major drivers in today’s decision process. 
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Acronyms 
AHP = Analytical Hierarchy Process 
C-5 DF = Saturn V launch vehicle/direct flight from Earth to lunar surface 
CH4 = methane 
CM = Command Module 
CSM = Command Service Module 
DDT&E = design, development, testing, and evaluation 
EOR = Earth orbit rendezvous 
FOMs = figures of merit 
LAM = Lunar Ascent Module  
LBM = Lunar Braking Module 
LEM = Lunar Excursion Module 
LEO = low-Earth Orbit 
LH2 = liquid hydrogen 
LLO = Low Lunar Orbit 
LOR = lunar orbit rendezvous 
LOx  = liquid oxygen 
LTDM = Lunar Touch-Down Module  
MADM = Multi-Attribute Decision Making  
NAFCoM = NASA/Air Force Costing Model 
NOVA DF = Liquid NOVA Direct Flight (large liquid propulsion launch vehicle/direct flight from Earth to  
   lunar surface) 
S-IVB = third stage of the Saturn V 
SM  = Service Module 
SPSP = Space Propulsion Sizing Program  
TEI = Trans-Earth Injection 
TLIS = Trans-Lunar Injection Stage 
TOPSIS = Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
1.0 Introduction 
With the initiation of NASA’s Space Exploration Program, the Georgia Institute of Technology has 
developed a space exploration research and academic program at the National Institute of Aerospace for 
the systems engineering, design, and analysis of advanced space architectures.  To focus the development 
of this program, the systems engineering and decision analysis processes used for the Apollo architecture 
mode selection have been researched to establish a required set of decision criteria and associated 
engineering analysis tools required for an architecture selection.   
In 1962, NASA established a systems analysis group at NASA Headquarters to compare the competing 
concepts for lunar exploration based on 1) early successful landing of manned spacecraft on the moon and 
safe return to Earth (President Kennedy’s criteria), 2) manned scientific missions, 3) utilization for 
advanced military missions, and 4) increase reliability and economy of achieved by multiple use of 
vehicle components, vehicle stages, and complete launch vehicles.1 This group eventually focused on four 
separate concepts2 that were advocated from Marshall Space Flight Center, Manned Space Center 
(Johnson Space Center), Jet Propulsion Lab, and Langley Research Center as explained later in the paper.  
Decision criteria established for operational mode selection by this group included performance (weight, 
margin, and sensitivity), probability of success of the first flight, time to first successful landing, 
probability of crew lost on the first attempt, research and development cost, operational cost of the first 
success, number of personnel at the lunar base, and man-year average cost.  Based on this study, a 
minimum set of conceptual analysis tools are trajectory performance, weights, reliability, stochastic 
scheduling (if schedule date is dictated), research and development cost, and operations cost.   
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This paper is the initial research in duplicating the Apollo decision process using modern engineering 
analysis and systems engineering tools.  Two perspectives where taken in this study, an historical 
perspective of what was driving the decisions in 1962 (schedule, technology uncertainty, and cost) and 
today’s driving perspective (human safety, emphasized cost, and sustainability).  In addition to 
conducting the engineering trade studies of the four architecture modes, modern multi-attribute decision 
analysis is used to identify the driving decision criteria then and now which was not used for the Apollo 
decision.  These driving selection criteria will focus the development of improved engineering analysis 
tools in order to arrive at a better architecture selection.  Finally, various propulsion technologies are 
infused into the architectures to identify key technology drivers in the design decisions for NASA’s Space 
Exploration program. 
2.0 Architecture Modes 
The four lunar architecture modes that NASA was considering in 1962 were Lunar Orbit Rendezvous 
(LOR), Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR), Liquid Nova Direct Flight (Nova DF), and Saturn C-5 Direct 
Flight (C-5 DF) as described in Ref.  3.  Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the concept of operations for each of 
the modes.   
The LOR mode requires one launch on the Saturn C-5 vehicle, whose Saturn V upper stage (S-IVB) 
doubles as the Trans-Lunar Injection Stage (TLIS).  The Command Service Module (CSM), that consists 
of the manned return and entry model called the Command Module (CM) and the lunar capture/trans-
Earth injection module called the Service Module (SM), separates from the stack while on the trans-lunar 
trajectory to re-orient and dock with the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) for lunar descent and ascent.  
The CSM, while docked to the LEM, performs a propulsive capture to attain Low Lunar Orbit (LLO).  
Two of the three crewmembers transfer to the LEM and begin their powered decent and landing on the 
lunar surface.  After the lunar mission is complete, the two crewmembers launch from the lunar surface 
using the Lunar Ascent Module (LAM); the Lunar Descent Module (LDM) is staged off and left on the  
 
Figure 1.  Lunar orbit rendezvous concept of operations.3 
lunar surface.  The LAM enters into an intercept trajectory to rendezvous and dock (thus Lunar Orbit 
Rendezvous) with the remaining crewmember in the orbiting CSM.  After transferring back to the CSM, 
the LAM is jettisoned and the CSM performs a Trans-Earth Injection (TEI) for direct reentry into the 
Earth’s atmosphere.  The Command Module (CM) then separates from the Service Module (SM), reenters 
the atmosphere, and splashes down in the ocean.   
The EOR mode requires two launches on the Saturn C-5 vehicle as shown in Fig. 2.  The first launch does 
not use the S-IVB upper stage; its payload is an unmanned tanker vehicle that contains sufficient  
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oxidizer to resupply the TLIS.  The TLIS launches with enough fuel for the entire mission, needing only a 
resupply of oxidizer.  The tanker waits in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) until the second launch.  From the top 
of the stack down, the second launch payload is the CM, SM, Lunar Touch-Down Module (LTDM), 
Lunar Braking Module (LBM), and TLIS.  The TLIS is the S-IVB upper stage from the manned Saturn 
C-5 launch vehicle, and the TLIS uses all of the on-board oxidizer to enter LEO.  The tanker and the 
manned stack then rendezvous and dock in LEO (thus Earth Orbit Rendezvous).  The oxidizer is 
transferred from the tanker to the TLIS.  The tanker separates and the TLIS performs the TLI.  In the 
vicinity of the moon, the LBM begins a retro burn to slow the stack on its approach.  The LBM is staged; 
without entering LLO, the LTDM begins a powered descent and landing on the lunar surface.  At the end 
of the lunar surface stay, the CSM launches from the lunar surface and performs the TEI maneuver for 
direct Earth reentry, leaving the LTDM on the lunar surface.  Near the Earth, the CM separates from the 
SM and reenters for splashdown. 
Figure 2.  Earth orbit rendezvous concept of operations. 3 
The two Direct Flight Options, Fig. 3, Nova DF and C-5 DF, entail the same maneuvers with different 
size and capability launch vehicles.  The Saturn C-5 launcher had a significantly smaller payload 
capability than the Liquid Nova launcher; this requires that the CSM be scaled down from a 154 in 
diameter to 138 in.  The direct flight modes require one launch on the Liquid Nova launch vehicle or 
Saturn C-5 launch vehicle, respectively.  After launch, the two modes are very similar to each other and to 
the EOR mode; the only difference is the mass and size of the hardware and there is no need for 
propellant transfer.  After insertion into LEO, the TLIS performs the TLI maneuver, pushing the CM, SM, 
LTDM, and LBM towards the moon.  The remainder of the mission follows the EOR mission directly.   
Figure 3.  Direct flight concept of operations. 3 
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3.0 Analysis  
3.1. General Approach 
Numerous differences between these four modes existed not only in their operational architecture, but 
also in their physical architecture and the propellant systems, size, and mission duration that would 
achieve the optimal performance from each configuration.  These modes, exactly as they were described 
in Refs. 2 and 3, were broken down and analyzed by cost, mass, reliability, and system sensitivity.  In 
order to achieve a level comparison, all systems were also set to the specifications used by the original 
LOR mode.  These changes included setting the command and service modules to a 154 in. diameter and 
using hypergolic propellants on the service and lunar modules instead of cryogenic propulsion.  This gave 
an “apples to apples” view of how these systems stacked up to one another.   
The design space was further widened by analyzing cryogenic systems that used liquid oxygen with either 
liquid hydrogen (LOx/LH2) or methane (LOx/CH4) on the service and lunar modules.  The TLISs were 
still assumed to be the S-IVB upper stage, or some derivative, and therefore used a LOx/LH2 system for 
all modes.  The braking stages were also assumed to utilize a LOx/LH2 system in order to achieve highest 
in-space performance.  All four modes were updated to be compatible with each propellant type and a full 
mass, cost, reliability, and sensitivity study was completed on each.  This resulted in sixteen distinct 
modes that were carried out through the rest of the study. 
3.2. 1960’s vs.  Modern Objectives 
While there are many similarities between the vehicles that being designed for the lunar mission today 
with those used in the Apollo program, the objectives for traveling to the Moon are vastly different.  
When making a final mode selection these differences can have a substantial effect.  As will be shown 
latter, throughout this study all analysis and selection was repeated twice using these two different 
mindsets.  When defining the 1960’s mentality, Ref. 3 was used to determine a thought process close to 
that of the original decision makers in 1962.  This included having a limited knowledge of space transfers, 
rendezvous and dockings, and the lunar surface.  For these reasons as well as the political environment of 
time, the programmatic sensitivities and development risk were the two largest factors.   
President Kennedy set a hard timeline that had to be met and with the uncertainty in these new space 
inventions.  These vehicles had large sensitivities and numerous immature technologies that could quickly 
become impossible to develop within the allotted time.  President Kennedy also stipulated that a man 
must not only land on the moon but also return and do so safely.  Uncertainty was already a large part of 
the design process, but in order to ensure that safest possible flight, reliability of all systems needed to be 
maximized wherever possible.  Cost and therefore sustainability were of least importance.  As a political 
challenge the space race needed to be won, and the President was willing to spend money to do so.  The 
United States was only concerned with being the first to the lunar surface even if the missions were 
expensive and only a few could be flown.   
Today there is no space race, and the President is calling for the United States to demonstrate its lead in 
science, research, and exploration, not just brute strength.  Thus, the new mission must be able to perform 
much more research on the surface as well as provide for a much longer surface stay.  NASA now has 
much more experience with manned spacecraft and in-space trajectories and maneuvers.  Newer tools, 
knowledge of past growth, and existing equipment also allow the modes to be defined with much less 
uncertainty.  Combined with President Bush’s loose timeline, this greatly reduces the importance of 
programmatic sensitivities and development risk.  The public perception of the importance of the space 
program and the importance of an astronaut’s life has also changed.  After the Columbia tragedy, NASA 
cannot afford another failure let alone a loss of life in today’s critical society.  Therefore, reliability is a 
major concern.   
Page 5 of 12 Pages 
Student Session II                                                    Paper No. GT-SSEC.E.2 
Perhaps the biggest change from a design aspect is that the system must be sustainable, which translates 
most directly to operations cost.  NASA is now on a very tight and uncertain budget.  This new program 
must not only be developed under the current restrictive budget, but be able to be maintained under a 
budget that is yet to be set and could be possibly be cut even further. 
3.3. Figures of Merit 
After analyzing the two thought processes for operational mode selection, a list of six figures of merit 
(FOMs) that could adequately rate each mode as well as relate to the objectives of the mission were 
developed.  One aspect important to each mindset was reliability.  In order to get the most variation as 
well as a qualitative assessment, reliability was defined to be the likelihood of any failure, critical or 
otherwise.   
Cost was separated into three categories: production, operations, and design, development, testing, and 
evaluation (DDT&E).  Production cost was defined as the cost to manufacture all hardware for one 
mission.  This included all in-space elements as well as launch vehicles.  Operations cost is the cost to 
operate a single mission, which included launch preparations, command center time, and facility 
maintenance.  All expenses prior to and including the production of the first complete fight system was 
incorporated into DDT&E cost.  Production and DDT&E cost were calculated and assessed quantitatively 
through the NASA/Air Force Costing Model (NAFCoM) as described later while operations cost was 
assessed qualitatively based on the number of launches and complexity of the systems and required 
maneuvers.   
Development risk took into account the number and complexity of critical technologies that need to be 
developed for each mode.  This was weighed against the time this development would take and the 
timeframe given and its flexibility.  Programmatic sensitivity is a measure of the interdependence of all 
elements of each mode;it shows the effect on the entire system when one element is changed.  It was 
assessed by adding a ten percent growth to the inert weight of each element and comparing the total mass 
with that of the mode without any growth.  Lower sensitivities decrease the margin needed on all systems 
that are affected by size and mass growth. 
3.4. Multi-Attribute Decision Making 
The selected operational mode was determined using a multi-attribute decision making (MADM) process, 
beginning with a weighting of the FOMs then using the weighting to rank the modes.  The relative 
importance of the FOMs was calculated using 
the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  As 
described by Saaty4, AHP uses a full factorial 
user-defined pair-wise comparison to 
numerically determine a normalized importance 
for each FOM.  In the process, AHP calculates 
a consistency ratio, which is used to ensure that 
the comparisons are consistent with each other, 
to eliminate bias, and to ensure there were no 
errors when filling out the inputs.  The 
weightings for each FOM and mentality are 
listed in Table I.  The resulting weights were 
then fed into the Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) to rank each of the modes with respect to the FOMs.  Kirby5 explains that TOPSIS incorporates 
a user-defined decision matrix that compares each alternative to the baseline using a number scale from 1 
to 9 with 5 being the same, 9 being much better, and 1 being much worse.  This matrix was populated 
Table I. Descriptions and weighting scenarios of the 
figures of merit 
 
Production Cost Cost per mission of manufacturing all required elements. 4% 13%
Reliability Probability of a hardware failure, critical or otherwise. 21% 33%
Operations Cost All costs per mission not inlcuding production 7% 33%
Development 
Risk
Probability that the technology required by one or more 
of the elements will not be fully developed in the 
desired timeframe.
21% 3%
DDT&E Cost Cost to design, develop, test, and evaluate all architecture systems to IOC. 4% 13%
Programmatic 
Sensitivities
Risk associated with the sensistivity of each element of 
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using normalized data from the mass sizing, costing analysis, reliability calculations, sensitivity studies, 
and qualitative engineering assessment where no hard data was available.  TOPSIS then formulates a 
“most ideal” and “least ideal” solution.  Their Euclidean distance from these “ideals” ranks the 
alternatives.  This entire process was carried out with both a 1960’s and modern approach.  Because these 
weightings were our opinions, sensitivity to the weights were conducted to determine the impact on 
preference order. 
3.5. Analysis Tools 
Vehicle masses were calculated using one of two tools.  In order to model all service, command, and lunar 
modules, an Excel based program designed to model Apollo and Apollo-like systems was used.  This 
program is based on historical Apollo data detailed in Ref.  6.  Inputs range from engine parameters to 
number of crew to mission duration and cover a wide range of system parameters that are known during 
the initial design phase.  This program sizes the system and propellant to meet payload requirements.  All 
modes were assumed to have the same technology using comparable hardware to that which was used by 
Apollo.   
The TLIS, LBM, and tanker were sized using the Space Propulsion Sizing Program (SPSP).7  The SPSP 
uses a combination of historical data, mass estimating relationships, and bottoms-up calculations to 
design in-space propulsion stages on a system-by-system basis.  It has been benchmarked against flown 
hardware and stages, including the Centaur Upper Stage, Delta IV Upper Stage, and S-IVB Upper Stage.  
In addition to the main SPSP, the tanker version, SPSP-T, was used to size the tanker for the EOR modes.  
These programs were developed within the Architectures, Missions, and Science Branch at NASA 
Langley Research Center.   
Using the Excel-based program “Quantitative Risk Assessment System: Shuttle Database” 8, the 
reliability of 39 components, systems, and maneuvers can be determined.  Some of the components are 
batteries, fuel cells, tanks, and displays.  Some of the systems described are the propulsion system, 
electrical system, and communications.  The maneuvers covered are rendezvous, docking, and separation.  
By selecting the applicable components, determining whether reliability is based on cumulative hours or 
cycles, and indicating the level of redundancy, the program provides the module’s reliability.  The 
product of all of the module reliabilities in the mission yields the system reliability.  This output is the 
probability of any failure of the system, and it does not make any assumptions about critical or fatal 
failures.  The primary assumption for using this program stems from the duration or number of cycles a 
component is used.  For example, any cryogenic tanks are based on the duration in which the engines are 
firing.  This program inherently assumes perfect reliability during dormant phases of the mission.   
The cost for each element was estimated using the NAFCoM.9  NAFCoM software allows the user to cost 
a project primarily based upon mass and technology development.  An element’s cost is evaluated using 
the defined database for each subsystem of the element.  The subsystem cost is based on three things: dry 
mass of the system, whether the system is an improvement on an existing system, and effective 
management over the project.  It was assumed, to make a conservative estimate, that each system was a 
new design with the worst possible management.  This was done for each of the elements modeled in 
NAFCoM.  NAFCoM was benchmarked versus the Apollo program for each of its modules, which was 
with approximately 15 percent of the actual cost. 
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4.0 1960’s Decision  
4.1. Selection Process 
The TOPSIS results for the actual modes evaluated in 1962 are shown in Fig.  4.  The plot shows the rank 
of the modes in each FOM.  For example, under Development Risk, the rank from highest to lowest is 
LOR, C-5 DF, Nova DF, and EOR where the Nova DF and EOR have similar scores in that category.  A 
first estimate for the best of the four modes is the one corresponding to the line that occupies the most 
area on the plot.  This is an incomplete view of the TOPSIS results since the relative weightings of the 
FOMs must also be considered.  The final result of TOPSIS for each mode using the 1962 mentality is 
shown in Table II.  The most ideal option receives a score close to one, and the least ideal option receives 
a score close to zero.  Since TOPSIS provides 
a relative assessment, if an option scores 
lowest in each of the FOMs, it will have a 
score of zero; this is seen in the EOR scores 
for the 1962 and Apples to Apples modes.  
The analysis indicates that LOR is a superior 
option over the other three modes.  This 
complete ranking, using modern systems 
engineering techniques and approaches, is 
consistent with the ranking found in 1962.   
The decision made in 1962 was based on 
similar analysis.  However, one of the 
objectives at that time was to rule out any 
mode that was technically infeasible.  The 
conclusion of the original study was that with 
the right amount of time and money any of 
the four modes could be used to land on the moon.1,3  Unfortunately, at the time of the mode comparisons, 
there had already been several contracts 
signed for development of key Apollo 
systems, including the CM, SM, and parts of 
the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle.  Since time 
was limited by the approach of the end of the 
decade, a mode needed to be technically 
sound and make the most use the hardware 

















Figure 4.  Apollo operational mode comparisons. 
Table II.  TOPSIS scores for 1962 modes. 
 
LOR 0.799 0.810 0.860 0.656 0.804
C-5 DF 0.564 0.645 0.716 0.279 0.795
Nova DF 0.334 0.339 0.609 0.190 0.670




The Nova DF mode was found to be the least complex, safest, and required the fewest technology 
advances.  It did, however, require the development of a much larger launch vehicle than that of the 
Saturn C-5, already under development.  This pushed its schedule such that the first attempt at a manned 
lunar landing would be after the end of the decade, making it an undesirable option.   
The C-5 DF mode required the use of high-energy cryogenic propellants in both the lunar landing and 
return stages.  The complex propulsion system, despite its high performance, allowed for the least margin.  
Additionally, this mode required a much smaller CM than that under development, providing a minimal 
working environment for the crew.  Combined with the high sensitivity to growth, the C-5 Direct was also 
removed as one of the recommended options.   
Of the remaining two options, EOR and LOR, probabilities of success and development risk were 
overwhelming criteria.  EOR had the lowest probability of safely landing on the moon and returning, 
nearly half that of the other three options (note that the two-launch versus single launch reliability was not 
considered in this paper).  Although, EOR and LOR required the development of rendezvous and docking 
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techniques and hardware; EOR had the additional requirements of propellant transfer, more use of 
cryogenic propulsion systems, and complicated launch operations due two launches in a short period of 
time.   
This leaves LOR as the only solution that meets all of the constraints.  Importantly, LOR enjoys the 
largest performance margin and has an independent lunar landing system optimized for its role, which 
reduces the mode’s sensitivity to module growth.  The one strong disadvantage that is pointed out by Dr.  
Wernher von Braun3 is that the LOR requires a complicated maneuver of rendezvous and docking 
240,000 miles from the Earth, where rescue is almost impossible.  However, he stated that, “…this 
particular disadvantage is far outweighed by the advantages listed above.”3
4.2. Comparisons 
In addition to the original four modes considered for Apollo, the detailed analysis was conducted for the 
“Apples to Apples” comparison and modes utilizing storable, LOx/LH2, and LOX/CH4 propellant 
combinations.  The TOPSIS results for these three propellant types are shown in Table II.  The most 
significant outcome of the analysis is that for each propellant combination considered the LOR mode was 
the best option.  This states that it is the best architecture choice, and the selection of propellant types can 
be made independently.   
In order to see the impact of the weightings of the 
FOMs, the weightings were adjusted so that each 
of the other modes could become the best option.  
There were no weighting schemes possible to 
make the EOR or Nova DF modes the best.  This 
is due to EOR representing the worst case for 
each of the FOMs and Nova DF being equal to or 
worse than C-5 DF in each FOM.  The 
weightings required to make the C-5 DF the best 
option are shown in Table III.  The most 
significant changes are an increased emphasis on reliability and development risk with decreases in 
programmatic sensitivity weight and a slight decrease in production cost and DDT&E emphasis.  These 
are simply a result of reducing LOR's advantages and boosting C-5 DF's advantages.   
Table III: FOM weights for LOR and C-5 DF 
 
Production Cost 4% 1%
Reliability 20% 31%
Ops Cost 7% 7%
Development Risk 20% 25%
Programmatic Sensitivities 43% 34%
Original
Weights
C-5 DF #1 
Weights
Figure 5 shows the plot of the TOPSIS rankings for each LOR propulsion technology option; it is a 
comparison between the three propellant alternatives for 
the LOR mode only.  Storable propellant engines show 
much better DDT&E and development risk because they 
have been further developed and more widely used in the 
past.  In the early 1960’s, a LOx/CH4 engine had yet to 
be developed.  Additionally, all three have the same 
operations cost because they all entail the same details 
after production of the elements through completion of 
the mission.  The plot and scores show that the decision 
performing the LOR mode with higher energy propellant 
types would not have automatically generated a better 
















Figure 5.  TOPSIS rankings for LOR modes
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5.0 Modern Results 
5.1. Mode Selection 
To begin the selection process with the modern weighting systems, the original modes from 1962 were re-
run through TOPSIS (Table IV).  The new thinking showed a significant effect on the final rankings 
giving the C-5 DF a clear advantage over the LOR and bringing the Nova DF much closer to the LOR.  
This trend was evident in both the original architectures as well as the “apples to apples” modes.   
The four modes were then separated into 
three groups with the different propellant 
types for the service, descent, and ascent 
modules where applicable.  These modes 
were run through TOPSIS both all together 
and separated by propellant type.  The 
results of each analysis gave the same order 
with the C-5 direct flight mode coming in 
fairly clear first for all propellant systems.  Second and third was relative tie between the LOR and Nova 
direct flight modes with the Nova in second when using the storable and LOx/LH2 propellants and third 
in LOx/CH4 systems.  These scores were too close to be able to make a clear distinction between the two.  
In a distant last was the EOR mode which ranked well below any other mode despite the propellant.   
Table IV.  TOPSIS scores with a modern mentality 
 
C-5 DF 0.886 0.891 0.905 0.702 0.839
LOR 0.736 0.734 0.776 0.476 0.766
Nova DF 0.679 0.699 0.790 0.621 0.754
EOR 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.155 0.351




From this analysis, a C-5 DF architecture using storable propellants on the service and touch down 
modules ranks the highest; however, TOPSIS is not a final selection tool and there are several high scores 
that rank closely.  TOPSIS is designed to be a good first cut tool and here shows that EOR methods rank 
far below the others and can be eliminated from further consideration.  With the similarities between the 
C-5 and Nova direct scenarios and the fact that the C-5 DF scored higher in all options considered, it can 
be argued that the Nova cases can be dropped as well.  This should be done with caution and with the 
inclusion of experience or knowledge gained outside of TOPSIS.   
5.2. Trends 
Though TOPSIS does not give a final selection, 
several trends can still be seen.  By looking at the 
C-5 DF modes shown in Fig. 6, it can be seen that 
the LOx/LH2 options are much more sensitive than 
the other options.  This is due mainly to the 
hydrogen tanks which are very large and due to the 
low density of liquid hydrogen; a slight increase in 
propellant mass required leads to a large increase in 
tank volume and subsequent structure.  LOx/LH2 
systems also suffer in reliability due to the 
difficulty in not only keeping the cryogens cold for 
such a long period of time, but also the difficulty in 
containing hydrogen.  These challenges also drive 
up the development and production costs as 
predicted by NAFCoM.   
The storable and LOx/CH4 solutions are 
comparable in all FOMs except DDT&E cost and 
sensitivity.  The higher performance of LOx/CH4 
















Figure 6.  Comparison of C-5 DF propellant systems 
with modern weighting scenario. 
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NAFCOM predicts a lower DDT&E cost for the storable modes due the lower system masses and more 
experience in using storable propellants.  If a decision is based entirely on initial mass to low-Earth orbit 
(IMLEO), the LOx/CH4 alternatives are the lightest with the storable and LOx/LH2 propellant options 
close behind.  The LOR modes give roughly half the IMLEO than the C-5 DF for each corresponding 
propellant option. The EOR modes have the highest IMLEO due to the tanker.  
With these trends in mind, it is therefore recommended that further analysis should be performed on a 
direct lunar mission LOx/CH4 and/or storable fuels on all stages that are to be landed on the lunar 
surface.  LOx/LH2 systems are recommended on all other stages, such as a TLIS and braking stage, for 
their increased performance.  If an LOR mode is selected, this study also warns against landing any 
LOx/LH2 systems on the lunar surface, but cannot draw any final conclusions between the use of storable 
propellants and LOx/CH4.   
Finally the weightings were shifted to find a 
mentality that would make LOR the top 
choice for today’s missions.  In order to bring 
LOR up to the level of the C-5 DF, the 
importance given to production cost would 
need to be shifted almost entirely to DDT&E 
cost.  Other minor changes that can be seen in 
Table V are the slight decrease in importance 
and reliability, which is spread out over 
operations cost, development risk and 
programmatic sensitivities.  This exercise 
verifies that the choice between the C-5 DF and LOR modes is very difficult to make.  While the change 
in production cost can be seen as dramatic, the other changes are very reasonable and could be the result 
of AHP if operated by other decision makers. 
Production Cost 13% 1%
Reliability 33% 24%
Ops Cost 33% 38%
Development Risk 3% 5%




LOR      
#1




The 1962 Apollo architecture mode decision process was revisited with modern analysis and systems 
engineering tools to determine driving decision criteria and design decisions that may be used for 
NASA’s current Space Exploration program.  Results of the study concluded with the following: 
1) The Lunar Orbit Rendezvous mode ranked the best based on the technology and design maturity along 
with politic goals in 1962.   
2) With greater emphasis on human safety and improvements in propulsion technology, a slight edge is 
given to the direct lunar mode over lunar orbit rendezvous.  It appears that NOVA direct and Earth orbit 
rendezvous (assuming a large launch vehicle must be developed) are not as competitive.   
3) Reliability and development, operations, and production costs are major drivers in today’s decision 
process because of more mature technologies and lower design uncertainties. 
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